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The history of
the Mannerheim Line
From the early days of independent
Finland to the Winter War
Part III
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in Part
I:
in Part
II :
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The defensive lines in the Karelian Isthmus
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The mobilization
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The Mannerheim Line ready and powerful?
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The Mannerheim Line in figures
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The concrete bunkers in the Mannerheim Line
- Field fortifications in the Mannerheim Line
Part III,
includes
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The defenses
in the "Summankylä"-sector
Note: the map shows the defensive works in the sector, so after a
some fighting and artillery bombardment, some of the defensive works
(mostly barbed wire) had been destroyed.
The sector of "Summankylä" (translates "the Summa
village") was the best fortified defense sector in the whole
Karelian Isthmus. The reason was obvious, the main road from Leningrad
to Viipuri went right through the small village, and the terrain allowed
the mass employment of tanks.
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Sources:
"Talvisodan Historia 2", p.110
"Suomen Linnoittamisen Historia
1918-1944", p.102
The small numbers in
the sides of the map represent the height from sea-level.
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1 = Field, meadow or otherwise open ground
2 = Forest (both dense and light)
3 = Swamp or marshy ground (including swampy forest)
4 = Concrete fortification (bunker), now showing both mg-bunkers
and passive fortifications
5 = Shelter / dugout ( wood & soil)
6 = Entrenched mg-nest
7 = Finnish AT-gun * |
8 = Finnish mortar platoon *
9 = Trench for a rifle and lmg-squad
10 = Observation team for mortars
11 = Mined and/or booby trapped area
12 = Barbed-wire obstacle
13 = Tank obstacle (rock rows) |
* = The sources didn't specify what
difference there was with the AT/mortar -symbol and the encircled
AT/mortar-symbol,
so I have to assume it's either an entrenched position or an alternate
position (I personally think it's the former).
Note that in these maps, all types woods (tree type and if it's
either dense / light) are marked with the same color. And finally,
most of these woods had been more or less swept away in the Soviet
artillery bombardment, cratering the whole battlefield. |
Additional note, there is some contradiction,
about the position of certain bunkers (namely Sk.13 and Sk.14, both
passive shelters) in different sources, and in case the information
differs, the information from the "Suomen Linnoittamisen Historia
1918-1944" has "won" the case.
The concrete bunkers in Summankylä
(sector abbreviation: "Sk")
Below is a table of the concrete bunkers in Summankylä,
divided into two categories depending on the decade when it was built
(20s or 30s). The "Frontal-firing bunkers" were, to my best
knowledge, all "Enckell" -type bunkers. I've added a link
in the bunker #, if I have a model of it in the "Bunker types"-page.
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Older fortifications
(built before the 1930s)
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| # |
old task / type |
new task / type |
| 1 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Passive shelter |
| 2 |
Frontal-firing and accommodation bunker |
3 mg flank-firing bunker with accommodation
for 26 men |
| 3 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Flank-firing bunker |
| 4 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Passive shelter |
| 5 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Flank-firing bunker |
| 6 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Flank-firing bunker |
| 7 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Passive shelter |
| 8 |
Frontal-firing bunker |
Passive shelter |
| 9 |
Frontal-firing bunker* |
(Flank-firing bunker)* |
| 12 |
Passive shelter |
Passive shelter |
| 13 |
Passive shelter |
Passive shelter |
| 14 |
Passive shelter |
Passive shelter |
| 15 |
Passive shelter |
Passive shelter |
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* = the modification
work on this "Enckell"-type bunker hadn't started
when the war began, so it remained unchanged
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Newer fortifications (built in the
1930s)
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| # |
Task / type |
Year of
construction |
| 10 |
3 mg flank-firing bunker*,
accommodation for a rifle platoon, mg-chambers had armor plates |
1937 |
| 11 |
2 mg flank-firing bunker,
accommodation for a rifle platoon |
1939 |
| 16 |
Passive shelter for a platoon,
Battalion HQ |
1939 |
| 17 |
Flank-firing bunker with
accommodation for a platoon |
1939 |
| 18** |
2 mg flank-firing bunker
(was still under construction when the war started and was not
finished)** |
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*
= had a 4th mg in a special gun mount which could be raised
and operated on the bunker roof (a frontal-firing mg)
** = Not visible on the above maps. It was located halfway between
Sk 9 and Sk 7 |
Table source: "Suomen
Linnoittamisen historia 1918-1944"
Back to Top !
A
panorama from the Summa village
taken from a Soviet 47th Corps artillery
observation post.
Picture source: "Talvisodan Historia 2",
p.115
Note the Finnish AT-obstacle, the "rock rows" in the middle
of the photos
Back to Top !
Two photos
taken of bunkers on the eastern side of the Summa village
(January 1940, the right one is with zoom)
Picture source: "Talvisodan Historia 2",
p.114
Back to Top !
The fields of fire from the concrete
bunkers in the Summa village
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The
concrete fortifications (also passive shelters in the above map)
have been numbered to ease identification. The following table
gives more detailed data about them (if you wish to compare the
table with the one table in the page "Concrete fortifications
in the Karelian Isthmus", the bunkers in this sector had
the abbreviation Sk).
Note that in the above maps, the
lake on the right is Lake Summa, the same as in the following
paragraph, about the "Lähde"-sector. The river
is the "Summajoki"-river (or more accurately translated
"River Summa").
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Back to Top !
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The breaking
of the line
The Summa village,
before and after the fighting
The Soviet 7th Army had concentrated 60 % of it's infantry units
and two thirds of it's artillery on a 40 km wide front from Karhula
(west of Summa) to lake Muolaanjärvi This gave an average of
2 - 4,5 inf. battalions and 50 -70 artillery pieces per km.
The commander of the Soviet Northwestern front had ordered that
the 10 first days of February should be used to conduct small probing
attacks and attempts to improve positions for the eventual major attack.
The attacks were conducted by company - battalion strength and were
supported by tanks. The Soviet tactics had improved. The tanks didn't
make unsupported charges, instead they waited if the infantry didn't
follow and they towed them in large armored sledges. The tanks kept
distance to the defender's trenches so that the few Finnish AT-guns
couldn't fire and the Soviet infantry kept the Finnish infantry AT-teams
at bay. The Soviet forces started to systematically destroy the defense
works (wire obstacles, AT-obstacles, shelters, bunkers etc.) after
they had gained some ground and before the Finnish counterattacks
threw them back.
Every day, the Soviet artillery poured shells on the Finnish line,
firing in a day more shells than the whole Finnish army had ever had
in it's stocks during the war. The Finnish reconnaissance flights
revealed scores of "fat targets" in the Soviet rear area,
but the Finnish artillery was not allowed to bombard them due to ammo
shortage, instead the Finnish artillery had strict orders to open
fire only on actual attacks. The Soviet Air Force had every moment
dozens of planes in the air increasing the devastation.
The Soviet artillery fired daily some 300 000 shells
in the Summa area alone. In comparison, on Feb. 11th, the day when the
Mannerheim Line was breached, the Finnish artillery in the same area
fired 5 962 shells.
On Sunday, February 11th, the dawn was hazy but cleared in a few
hours. The temperature was -20 ° Celsius, around the same as in
the previous days.
At 0840 hrs began a drumfire along the whole sector of the Finnish
3rd Division. Just before noon, the Soviet 100th division started
the attack on the Summa-sector, the 138th west of the Summa-sector
towards Karhula and the 123rd east of Lake Summa at the Lähde-sector.
The attackers were supported by several hundred tanks.
Back to Top !
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The "Lähde"
sector
The
map on the left shows the positions of the concrete fortifications
on the "Lähde" -sector, where the Mannerheim Line was
breached, and the fields of fire for the machine gun bunkers.
Note that the "Summankylä"-sector, starts just from
the western side of Lake Summa.
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Table with information of the bunker types and when they were built
| # |
Type |
Notes |
| Sj 1 |
Frontal firing
1 mg bunker |
built in the 20's |
| Sj 2 |
Shelter |
built during the
mobilization |
| Sj 3 |
Frontal firing
1 mg bunker |
built in the 20's |
| Sj 4 |
2 mg + shelter
for 26 men |
"Poppius",
built in '37, had armor plates * |
| Sj 5 |
3 mg + shelter
for 40 men |
"Millions",
built in '39 |
| Sj 6 |
Shelter |
built in the 20's |
| Sj 7 |
"concrete
trench" |
built in the 20's |
| Sj 8 |
"concrete
trench" |
built in the 20's |
| *
= had armor plates on the front wall and roof of the machine gun
chambers, frontal firing! |
Table source: "Suomen Linnoittamisen historia
1918-1944"
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The
strongpoints in the Lähde sector in December 1939
(as it was manned then by the 1st Bn / JR 13)
Source: "Summa", p.35
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Strongpoint strength
- 2 rifle squads, 2 lmg-squads, 3 mg
- 3 rifle squads, 2 lmg-squads, 4 mg, *
- 3 rifle squads, 2 lmg-squads, 1 mg
- 3 rifle squads, 2 lmg-squads
- 4 rifle squads, 3 lmg-squads, 2 mg, **
- 2 rifle squads, 3 lmg-squads, 2 mg
- 1 rifle squad, 1 lmg-squad, 1 mg
- 1 rifle squad, 1 lmg-squad, 2 mg
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* = also the command post of a artillery battery
commander and an artillery observer
** = also an artillery observer
In addition the battalion had 2 mg in reserve, the
mortar platoon had two 81 mm mortars
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The
"Lähde"-sector, east of lake Summa, was defended by
the strengthened 2nd battalion of the JR 9 (the 9th Infantry Regiment),
a total of some 400 - 500 men on a 4 km wide sector.
The I strongpoint was manned by a infantry platoon, led by 2nd Lt.
Leino, from JR 8 and a couple machine guns.
The 4th company, led by Lt. M.G.Ericsson, manned the Finnish right
wing, the strongpoints II and III.
Strongpoint II, the notorious "Finger"-strongpoint (situated
at the small hill where the Sj 5 bunker "The Million bunker"
was located) was particularly subjected to heavy enemy fire and a
saying "Life in the Finger is short" was indeed well earned.
Unfortunately the eastern mg-casemate of Sj 5 was nearly useless due
to the damage sustained during the weeks of bombardment.
The 6th company, led by Lt. Malm, manned the strongpoints IV, V and
VI. The bunker "Poppius" (Sj 4) sat right in the middle
of the company. But this bunker too was badly mauled and its combat
value greatly reduced.
The 5th company, led by Lt. H.V.Hannus, manned the strongpoints VII
and VIII. There had been an old (1920s) bunker, Sj 3, near the strongpoint
VII, but it had been rendered useless on 15 January after a direct
hit by a 6 or 8 inch shell. The VIII strongpoint, also called the
Jackboot grove, had lost its shelter in the enemy artillery fire and
thus the garrison had to billet in a shelter some 1,5 km in the rear.
As the route backwards ran partly through open country, it was both
hazardous and straining journey for the men even to get into their
positions from their shelter.
By
1130 hrs, all communications were down, and as the Soviet artillery
fire shifted from the front-line positions towards the Finnish rear,
the enemy infantry attacked. The only working AT-gun in the sector
was situated behind the Sj 5. This gun and the few weak Finnish artillery
barrages knocked out 6 Soviet tanks, which wasn't nearly enough as
dozens of others advanced followed closely by Soviet infantry. As
most of the tanks continued their advance into the Finnish rear, 7
tanks began to clear the Finnish positions towards the Sj 5.
The Soviet infantry which had been waiting for the artillery fire
to shift not far from the "Finger" (strongpoint II) had
managed to capture it quickly but the Finns threw them back around
noon. The attack was renewed and again repulsed. Savage fighting raged
around the Sj 5 and the "Finger" strongpoint, but the Finns
held their positions.
But in the center, the defense wasn't as successful. The Soviet tanks
were concentrated near the road and thus the 6th company near Sj 4
(the "Poppius") was fighting a lost battle as they had no
AT-guns and the enemy infantry made it impossible to use molotov cocktails
or satchel charges. The Poppius was by now out of actions, but the
some tanks made things sure and parked themselves in front of the
embrasures blocking any possible fire from inside.
Around noon the commander of strongpoint V gave the order to withdraw.
The Soviet tanks rolled forward uncontested while some turned east
towards the Jackboot grove. To avoid being encircled, the 5th company
started to withdraw. By 1300 hrs, the Soviet 123rd division, commanded
by Colonel F.F.Aljabushev, had succeeded in capturing one of the Finnish
concrete bunkers (the Sj.4 nicknamed "Poppius") and the
strongpoints east of it.
The defending Finnish battalion, II/JR 9, could offer only scattered
resistance, and so by 1900 hrs, the 123rd had advanced to the "back
line" of the Finnish positions. The back line was defended by
the III/JR 8 and it was strengthened by two engineer companies. The
Finnish counterattack by the I/JR 8 was launched at 2000 hrs, and
while it started successfully, it ran out of steam by midnight.
The Finnish counterattacks on the next two days were unsuccessful
and so the Mannerheim Line was breached. The situation worsened until
on February 15th a general order, to abandon the defense positions,
was given to the units of the II Corps, now threatened by encirclement.
Some indications of the brutality of the fighting gives the strength
of the II/JR 9 on February 13th. The battalion had (a small replacement
detachment excluded) only a total of 165 men left in the rifle and
mg-companies.
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Go back to Part
I
Go back to Part
II
See also:

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