The Finnish Army
in Winter War
Part II
In Part II
The Order of Battle of the Finnish Army on Nov 30th 1939
(
The image has hotspots! )

| JR = infantry regiment Kev.Os = light detachment Er.P = separate battalion JP = Jaeger battalion |
KTR = field artillery regiment Rask.Psto = heavy art. battalion Psto / #.Pr = brigade art. battalion Psto = art. battalion |
KT-Pr. = field replacement brigade URR = Uudenmaa dragoon reg. HRR = Häme cavalry reg. PPP = bicycle battalion |
(Note that these tables are a summary of different tables and maps, found mostly in "Talvisodan Historia 1", so there is a chance that they are not 100 % correct)
The
Isthmus Army |
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II Corps |
III Corps (Major General A.E.Heinrichs) |
Reserve | |||||||
| 4.D | 5.D | 11.D | U-Group | M-Group | L-Group | 8.D | 10.D | R-Group | 1.D |
| JR 10 | JR 13 | JR 31 | URR* | Er.P 1 | Er.P 2 | JR 23 | JR 28 | 3.Pr | 1.Pr |
| JR 11 | JR 14 | JR 32 | HRR* | Er.P 4 | Er.P 5 | JR 24 | JR 29 | Er.P 6 | 2.Pr |
| JR 12 | JR 15 | JR 33 | Er.P 3 | JP 3 | JP 2 | JR 26 | JR 30 | JP 4 | Psto/1.Pr |
| KTR 4 | KTR 5 | KTR 11 | Er.P 7 | KTR 8 | KTR 10 | M-Os.** | Psto/2.Pr | ||
| Kev.Os 4 | Kev.Os 5 | Kev.Os 11 | JP 1 | Kev.Os 8 | Kev.Os 10 | Psto/3.Pr | Psto/4.Pr | ||
| PPP 5 | Rask.Psto 1 ¤ | Rask.Psto 4 ¤ | |||||||
| Rask.Psto 2 ¤ | |||||||||
| Rask.Psto 3 ¤ | |||||||||
NOTE: Table
shows only the units that are roughly battalion size. Separate/independent companies,
batteries etc. are not included |
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(to see the Isthmus Army deployment on Nov 30th 1939, click the
image below)

IV Corps |
P-SR (Major General V. Tuompo) |
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| 12.D | 13.D | TF Räsänen | Er.P 11 | Reserve | LR | P-KR | |
| JR 34 | JR 37 | Er.P 10 | PPP 7 | Er.P 17 | Er.P 12 | Er.P 15 | |
| JR 35 | JR 38 | Er.P 112 | Er.P 13 | Er.P 16 | |||
| JR 36 | JR 39 | Er.P 14 | Er.P 25* | ||||
| KTR 12 | KTR 13 | Er.P 26* | |||||
| Kev.Os 12 | Kev.Os 13 | ||||||
| Er.P 8 | |||||||
| Er.P 9 | |||||||
NOTE: Table shows
only the units that are roughly battalion size. Field replacement units (including
battalions), separate companies etc. are not included in the table. |
|||||||
Commander-in-Chief's reserves |
||||
| 6.D | 9.D | KT-Pr | Aaland Group |
|
| JR 16 | JR 25 | IV/KT-Pr | PPP 6 | JR 22 |
| JR 17 | * | V/KT-Pr | PPP 8 | |
| JR 18 | JR 27 | VI/KT-Pr | II / KTR 6 | |
| KTR 6 (-II Psto) | KTR 9 (- I Psto) | VIII/KT-Pr | I / KTR 9 | |
| Kev.Os 6 | Kev.Os 9 | IX/KT-Pr | ||
| X/KT-Pr | ||||
| XI/KT-Pr | ||||
| XII/KT-Pr | ||||
| XIII/KT-Pr | ||||
NOTE:
Table shows only the units that are roughly battalion size, separate companies etc. are
not included |
||||
The most important task of the Home Front troops, was to transport replacements to the Field Army. At the start of the mobilization, 3 replacement divisions (1.Koti-T-D - 3.Koti-T-D) were formed from the excess reservists, conscripted men and a small number of officers and NCO's. Each replacement division (all replacement units had a "Koti-T" in front of their abbreviation, like "1.Koti-T-D" for "1st Home Front replacement division") consisted of
- 3 T-JR (replacement infantry regiment)
- 1 kevyt-T-P (light replacement battalion)
- 1 T-KTR (replacement artillery regiment)
- 1 T-PionP (replacement Pioneer battalion)
- 1 Viesti-T-P (replacement signals battalion)
- 1 Huolto-T-P (replacement supply battalion)
In addition to these, the 1.Koti-T-D had also
- 1 panssari-T-K (replacement tank company)
- 1 mittaus-T-Ptri (replacement survey battery)
and the 3.Koti-T-D had
- 1 raskas-T-Ptri (heavy replacement battery)
- 1 kaasusuojelu-T-P (replacement gas protection battalion)
- 1 R-T-R (replacement cavalry regiment)
Also, in late October, the AT-gun training centre started the training of AT-gun platoons in Hämeenlinna.
The Field replacement brigade, (hereafter KT-Pr.) was formed under the command of the General HQ, to replace larger losses, transporting whole companies and battalions to the Army.
The main purpose was to train men for replacement purposes for the frontline units. During the early phases of the mobilization, from late October onwards, manpower shortages were handled by the replacement divisions. The replacements were to be transported to the divisional replacement battalion, from which they were to be allocated further as ordered by the division commander.
Changes during the war
As the Army had a chronic shortage of units, the battalions of the KT-Pr. had to be used to in the frontline. This led to changes in the replacement system. On Dec 1st, an order was issued to reform the replacement divisions into brigades, increasing the unit number. Also JR 40 was formed and attached to 9.D to replace the JR 26, which had been attached to 8.D.
This change wasn't of long duration, as on Dec 9th, a new order was issued,
that the Home Front troops should switch back into divisional organization. The only
visible result of the "re-forming" was that the JR 40 was formed, and the
2.Koti-T-D was left without the 3rd regiment (the result of forming the JR 40).
The reason for this was the appalling situation on the front. It was
more efficient to use the troops in the frontline as units, than to replace slowly the
losses. On Dec 19th, the 1.Koti-T-D became the 21.D (JR 61 - JR 63), the
2.Koti-T-D became the 22.D (JR 64 - JR 65), and the 3.Koti-T-D became the
23.D (JR 67 - JR 69).
As the replacement divisions were now taken into the Field Army, the task of feeding replacement was given to hastily erected training centres, which started the work from Dec 18th onwards.
| 7 infantry training centres, 1 tank training centre, 1 pioneer
training centre, 1 signals training centre, 1 supply training centre, 1 gas protection
centre, 2 cavalry training centres, and 3 artillery training centres were formed. More training centres were raised during the war, adding a mortar training centre, 2 artillery training centres and 2 infantry training centres. |
Throughout the war, came new orders to raise new units, and while the requests for replacements were given in December-January through official channels, from February onwards (after the Red Army started it's major offensive) the losses mounted so fast, that requests were made simply by a phone call.
A rough estimate of delivered
replacements, from the Home Front to the Field Army
(no exact figures are available)
| Time period | replacements for losses or shortages |
formed into new units |
Total (men) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobilization | 2 400 | 1 700 | 4 100 |
| December 1939 | 3 300 | 21 200 | 24 500 |
| January 1940 | 10 100 | 17 300 | 27 400 |
| February-March 1940 | 25 400 | 29 900 | 55 300 |
| Total (men) | 41 200 | 70 100 | 111 300 |
(Table source: "Talvisodan Historia 4", WSOY 1991, p.166)
Late in the war, the shortage of manpower was alarming. Marshal Mannerheim called this an even greater shortage than the shortage of equipment. To give the negotiators in Moscow, as great non-direct support (by reinforcing the Army at the front) as possible, Mannerheim ordered the "last human resources"(meaning troops with even some training), 14 battalions in training centres with poor equipment and little training, behind the frontline in detachments consisting of 3-4 battalions, which started to arrive to the main theatre on March 5th.
The following pages provide more data: