Finnish Artillery Arm
in the Winter War
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The roots of the
Artillery Arm
When the fight for Finland's independence began in
January 1918, the White army (the army of the new independent Finland)
had no field artillery. During the war, the Whites captured hundreds
of guns from the reds (communists) and the Russian army, which supplied
the reds with guns and shells. These guns formed the backbone of the
Finnish artillery of the 20s and the 30s. Generally, February 2nd
1918, when an invitation was published in the newspapers, where secondary
school graduates and men with a technical training were asked to join
the artillery, is considered to be the founding day of the artillery
school.
In the early years of independence, the peace time
field artillery was consisted of 5 artillery regiments, a survey battalion
and a horse artillery battery. After the Defense Forces made the changes
for the new mobilization system, which came into effect on January
1st 1934, the peace time artillery branch consisted of 4 artillery
regiments and the riding battery of the cavalry brigade.
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The tactical
and organizational development before the war
After the War of Independence, work began to study
what artillery organization would suit Finnish Army. The basis of
this was the German triangular artillery regiment (with three artillery
battalions, with three batteries each) and independent artillery battalions.
In the early 1930s, before the new mobilization system came into effect
(in which the "Cadre mobilization" was changed to a "Regional
mobilization") , the temporary wartime artillery organization
and strength was accepted on June 19th 1931.
The new organization directives ordered the Artillery Regiment to
have 3 artillery battalions, each having 2 cannon batteries and 1
howitzer battery. The new directive allowed, due to the wide scale
of equipment, to form also artillery battalions having 3 cannon batteries.
Before the Winter War started, these type of "mixed"
artillery battalions were thought essential to Finnish use, the cannons
giving adequate range and the howitzers offered more punch while having
less range than the cannons.
In 1936, the Operative section of the Finnish General
Headquarters (hereafter GHQ in the text) compiled a memo, where the
deployment of the artillery forces, into different directions (fronts)
was handled in detail. The memo also deliberated about the munitions
supply problems caused by the "mixed" artillery battalions,
and possible changes in deployment plans. But in practice, the memo
didn't cause any decisive changes.
Among the key elements of the tactical use of field
artillery, were the composition of force and the ordered fire missions.
The objective was to concentrate the fire. In the 1920s, an original
firing method was developed, which required that as the artillery
battalion was the basic firing unit (in most other countries the basic
firing unit was still a battery) . The available artillery, in combat
situations, was divided into support units (giving quick and direct
support) , support battalions and general support battalions (able
to give support to several infantry units) .
The chief developer of the artillery tactics was Lt.Col.
Torvald Ekman, who was the artillery instructor in the War College
in Finland, and who drew up the necessary instructions.
It has to be noted, that even while the artillery battalion
was the basic firing unit, individual batteries could still be assigned
to a infantry unit. The tactical command of the battery was with the
battery commander who worked in close cooperation with the commander
of the group that was to be supported. The technical "command
of the fire" was assigned to the fire observation unit, by the
battery commander, which in a light battery consisted of two fire
observation teams (hereafter FO-team in the text) . A heavy battery
had only one FO-team.
The firing battery (meaning the actual firing unit)
was led by the battery executive officer (executive officer is hereafter
XO in the text) , who followed orders from the artillery battalion
XO. The battalion XO was usually subordinated to the Artillery Commander
of the combined arms (usually division) . But if required by the situation,
the artillery battalion XO could be subordinated directly to the commander
of the infantry unit, which was to be supported. The munitions supply
of a battery was also under the command of the battery XO, as it was
also counted as "fire position" operations. When an artillery
regiment deployed into firing positions, the commander and the HQ
staff of the artillery regiment was attached to the divisional HQ,
as the Artillery Commander and his HQ staff.
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Vilho Petter
Nenonen
6 March 1883 -
17 February 1960
(Photo courtesy of Jyri Paulaharju)
The most important man in the history of the Finnish
artillery is Vilho Petter Nenonen
(hereafter "V.P. Nenonen" or just "Nenonen" in
the text) .
(So far I haven't included to my website any sections dedicated to
individual persons, but in this case I think an exception is in order)
The military career of V.P. Nenonen began in 1894,
when he began his studies in the Finnish Cadet Corps in Hamina. In
1901, he graduated, becoming an officer, and he continued his studies
in the Mikhail Artillery College, in St. Petersburg. Nenonen eventually
served in many different units and offices gaining valuable experience
and skills.
As a curiosity I decided to add this. Vladimir
Davydovits Grendal, who was born on April 3rd 1884 in
Helsinki with a Finnish name of Wladimir D. Gröndahl, and
died on November 16th 1940 in Moscow, was a very important
man in the history of the Soviet artillery. He too was an
artillery officer, and a contemporary of Nenonen, and in fact
the two men knew each other very well. In their youth, when
they both were young cadets, they worked occasionally together,
and were neighbors, sharing the same villa. After WW 1 broke
out, Grendal was appointed to command an artillery division
in 1916, and as his division left to the front, the two men
never saw each other again. Grendal, having the rank of Army
Commander 2nd Class, commanded the Soviet 13th Army in the
Karelian Isthmus from Dec 25th 1939 to the end of the war.
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When WW 1 broke out, Nenonen had the rank of Captain,
and during the war he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
When the Finnish War of Independence began, Nenonen was on an assigned
arms purchasing mission in Norway. After hearing of the incidents
back home, he immediately resigned from the service of the Russian
Army, and traveled to Finland.
Mannerheim had already heard much of this young talented
officer, who appointed him with the task of creating the field artillery
arm to the young Finnish army. Only days after Nenonen was founding
the artillery school in Pietarsaari (he arrived to Pietarsaari on
Feb 7th) , Mannerheim appointed him (on Feb 10th) to the duty of inspector
of artillery", and received an office in the Finnish GHQ, where
his duties included also ordnance and munitions issues. On that same
day he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. He eventually left Pietarsaari
on Feb 13th, to start his new assignment. After the war, Nenonen was
granted an one month vacation, in May 1918, and after he returned,
he noted that the office of artillery inspector was closed, and that
he had been transferred to the coastal artillery branch. On December
31st 1918, a new office was opened, the office of "Senior inspector
of the field artillery". The office title was changed on February
12th 1919, to "Senior inspector of artillery", as the office
was responsible for both field and coastal artillery. The title was
again changed on May 9th 1919, back to the original "inspector
of artillery". The office was held first by Col. Ludwig August
Schwindt (Jan 5th 1919 - Feb 4th 1919) , who was followed by Major
General Karl Edward Kivekäs (Feb 9th 1919 - May 25th 1920) . Then,
finally, Nenonen was again appointed to the office of "inspector
of artillery" on May 25th 1920.
Nenonen held the office almost continuously, raising
in the rank first to Major General and then to Lieutenant General
in 1930, until April 16th 1937 when he was appointed as the head of
the "weapon designing board".
After the Winter War had started, Mannerheim appointed
Lt. General Nenonen again to the office of "inspector of artillery"
on December 16th 1940. He held the office until February 15th 1947,
receiving the promotion to "General of Artillery" on October
3rd, 1941, and he was awarded the "Mannerheim Cross" (the
highest Finnish military decoration) on January 8th 1945.
General Nenonen is widely regarded as the father
of the Finnish artillery, being in addition of a talented officer,
also a brilliant scientist and inventor.
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Firing Technique
As the new firing method (using a whole artillery
battalion as the firing unit) was adopted in the 1920s, all
necessary personnel, essential in using this new method, had
been trained in the years preceding the Winter War. In numerous
gunnery maneuvers, the effect of different firing techniques
were studied, and the results were combined into the 1936
artillery regulations.
The fire control chart, a fire observation
instrument introduced in the 1920s, enabled the quick transfer
of fire (i.e. fast switching of targets) . Before the fire
control chart was developed by V.P. Nenonen,
the Finnish artillery used the old "Sine"-technique,
which was adopted by the Russian artillery in 1911. The drawback
of this systems was it's complexity, requiring a mathematically
talented man to calculate the firing data, which was a rather
demanding task in action. The new benefits of the new firing
chart was numerous. It made the calculation of firing data
quicker being at the same time simple enough to be used efficiently
in the battlefield. It also removed the usual "bunch
of small errors", that plagued the sine-technique. And
if the exact position of the battery was unknown, the chart
made it possible to determine it's exact position with a few
ranging shots.
The fire control chart was quickly classified,
as the fast fire control system was, at the time, ahead of
any other system anywhere in the world.
The target priorities were, according to the
tactical regulations:
1) counter-battery activity
2) counter-preparation (preventive barrage)
3) blocking fire (bombarding attacking enemy formations) .
Note that in the Winter War, the shortage of shells
forced the Finnish artillery to save most of it's available
shells to blocking fire, only rarely bombarding Soviet artillery
positions.
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Firing
methods
("Ammuntalaji" in Finnish)
The different tactical firing methods were:
After the target or target area has been chosen
(the different tactical firing options could include multiple
target points and/or target areas) , those are then fired
upon with the chosen form of fire, that is chosen according
to the situation.
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Forms of
fire
("Tulimuoto" in Finnish)
The different forms of fire were the fire
strike, barrage fire, fire
suppression, destruction fire and
harassing fire.
As has been said before, the main objective
was fire concentration, i.e. concentrate the fire of many
firing units (artillery battalions) into the same target,
thus maximizing the fire density in the chosen unit of time.
The differences of forms of fire was as follows:
"fire
strike"
("tuli-isku" in Finnish)
means rapid fire on a 100m x 100m (hectare) area.
Duration 60 seconds and the number of shells fired was
1/10 unit of fire. ( i.e. With a
battalion armed with 76 mm guns, the "fire strike"
demanded that the battalion fired 120 shells on a 100m
x 100m area in one minute). An artillery battalion could
also fire a "half-fire strike", in where the
fire lasted only 30 seconds, and the amount of shells
was 1/20 unit of fire (50 % from the "fire strike")
.
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"barrage
fire"
("sulku" in Finnish)
if barrage fire was ordered, the fire was commenced
immediately as fast as the individual batteries were
ready (so the other batteries didn't wait for the slowest
to be ready) one battery at the time (each battery having
a 100 m wide target area) , to an area that was usually
some 300 m wide and 150 m deep, and usually positioned
close to the friendly lines, to a safe distance. Duration
usually 120 seconds, and the amount of shells fire 1/10
unit of fire. Also a "half-barrage
fire" could be fired, where the amount of shells
fired was 1/20 unit of fire.
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"fire
suppression"
("peite" in Finnish)
was used to neutralize enemy infantry in a the target
area, and the area size was 100 wide and 300 m deep.
The amount of shells fired was usually 1/10 unit
of fire. It could also be fired as a "broad-fire
suppression" ("leveä peite" in Finnish)
, where the target area was 300m wide and 300 m deep.
Fire suppression could also be fired as a "half-fire
suppression", where the amount of shells fired
was 1/20 unit of fire.
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"destruction
fire"
("hävitystuli" in Finnish)
was observed and concentrated bombardment
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"harassing
fire"
("häirintä" in Finnish)
was firing at irregular intervals, either by firing
one or more"groups" (a "group" meaning
a single shell being fired by each gun) , or even single
shots.
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Unit of fire
("Tuliannos" in Finnish)
The "unit of fire" is a unit of measurement,
which is used both to simplify munitions logistics, restrict
munitions consumption and to keep the rate of fire in such
limits that it won't wear down the barrel too much. So the
Finnish "Tuliannos" could also be translated as
"required supply rate".
(All weapons, artillery pieces, small arms
etc., have a set "unit of fire")
In Finnish artillery, the "unit of fire"
was set according to the caliber. These were as follows:
75 mm - 76 mm |
100 shells/gun |
105 mm - 122 mm |
60 shells/gun |
152 mm - 155 mm |
40 shells/gun |
Thus, as an example, an artillery battalion
firing a "fire strike" (12 guns firing into a 100
m x 100 m area) expends 1/10 unit of fire. If it fires a "half
fire strike", the expenditure is 1/20 unit of fire.
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The amount of shells
used with different forms of fire
by an artillery battalion, according to the 1936 regulations
Form of fire |
Caliber
|
76 mm cannon
|
107 mm cannon
|
122 mm howitzer
|
152 mm howitzer
|
fire
strike* |
120 |
80 |
60 |
40 |
barrage
fire |
40 |
25 |
20 |
15 |
fire
suppression** |
120 |
80 |
60 |
40 |
*= if the form was "half-fire strike",
the shell amounts were 60, 40, 30, 20
** The number is for a 300 m x 300 m area, if the target
area was 100 m x 100 m, the amounts were 40, 25, 20,
15. Also, if the chosen form of fire was "half-barrage
fire, the shell amounts were 50 % of the full amount.
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Back to Top !
The artillery
meteorological message
In order to achieve the main purpose; land
the first grenades into the target at the same time thus maximizing
the destruction effect in the target area, the batteries had
to fire exactly at the right time. This wasn't simply possible
without very precise and reliable preparations. These pre-fire
preparations were topographic -, ballistic - and meteorological
preparations.
Topographic preparations meant calculating
correct and accurate coordinates for the positions of the
batteries, fire observation positions and, of course, different
preset targets and target areas. The instruments for this
were accurate maps, aerial photographs, surveys and exact
determination of direction (using e.g. sun- and star based
measurement, and magnetic instruments like the compass and
azimuth-disc) . The topographic preparations also included
in measuring the battery sheaf.
Ballistic preparations included that
different factors effecting the muzzle velocity, should be
taken into account. These included temperature of the propellant
charge (powder) and the difference in quality between different
batches of powder. Also the performance differences between
different shell types and possible differences between separate
shell production batches and different sized propellant charges
were to be known in detail. The actual differences in muzzle
velocities between individual guns was also determined (barrel
wear etc.) .
Meteorological preparations demanded
several different measurements to identify the possible weather
factor. These included the measurement of wind velocity and
direction in different altitudes, the temperature, air pressure
and air humidity.
This meteorological preparation method was accepted
in 1925 and was developed by V.P. Nenonen and the artillery
meteorologist Lt.Col Hugo Karsten, who was also known
as an able scientist.
All the accumulated data was then combined,
with a graphical and mathematical method of calculation, into
an artillery meteorological message. This message was
then used by the firing units to calculate the needed adjustments,
caused by the weather factor, into the firing data.
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Battery sheaf
("viuhka" in Finnish)
The battery sheaf means that when the battery is emplaced,
the distance between separate guns is exactly 25 m, and they
are pointing exactly in the same direction. Thus, as the distance
between guns was 25 m in the battery position, the space between
exploding shells in the target area was 25 m.
If the battery was firing e.g. a fire strike,
the guns were aligned to fire into the same spot (the natural
dispersion taking care of the dispersing the shells in the
target area). This was called a converged sheaf.
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The mobilization
On the eve of Winter War, in autumn 1939, virtually
all the guns of the Finnish field artillery were war-booty guns from
the war of independence. Only a few dozen guns had been bought between
1919 - 1938. Most of the guns were somewhat useless and ammunition
supplies were low. Another drawback was that 89 % of the artillery
was light (Germany, in 1939, had roughly 60 % light - 40 % heavy)
.
When Finland started to mobilize, the low number
of guns was painfully realized, and the reserve of usable guns was
almost nonexistent.
The serious drawbacks of the artillery lead, when the
threat was realized, to hectic efforts to buy more guns from anyone
willing to sell, but when Germany attacked Poland, it became harder
as every country started to arm themselves.
As the Field Army was mobilized, so was the artillery units. In
general, the artillery was organized into divisional artillery regiments,
separate artillery battalions under the command of the General HQ
(hereafter GHQ in the text) , and a number of separate batteries.
As was said before, the objective was to equip each battalion of
an artillery regiment with 2 cannon batteries and 1 howitzer battery.
Due to the insufficient amount of howitzers, some battalions had to
be equipped with cannons only.
Click here to see the page "Finnish
artillery units at the start and end of the Winter War"
The bulk of the Finnish artillery was concentrated to the Karelian
Isthmus. The situation was the worst in Northern Finland, where there
wasn't any division deployed, who would've had their organic artillery.
Instead, to the whole length of border between the area that was defended
by the IV Corps, north of Lake Ladoga, and the Arctic Ocean, only
a few separate batteries could be spared.
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Artillery unit
organizations
In general, the artillery regiment was more of an administrative
unit, as the artillery units were grouped together in artillery groups,
which could have artillery battalions from different artillery regiments
and individual batteries or battalions.
The organization
of the Finnish artillery regiment
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Official strength
|
personnel: |
1 813 |
horses: |
636/1 164 (summer/winter) |
motor vehicles:
|
40 |
bicycles: |
615 |
guns: |
36 |
The organization
of a light artillery battalion
(which has 2 light cannon batteries and one light howitzer battery)
The total official strength of this type of artillery
battalion was 580 men (look at the artillery regiment organization
above) .
FO-team = Fire observer team
("tulenjohtoryhmä" in Finnish)
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Translations
"command platoon" = "komentojaos"
"firing position platoon" = "asemajaos"
"fir.pos. team" = "asemaryhmä"
"survey team" = "mittausryhmä"
"delivery platoon" = "toimitusjaos"
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The organization
of a motorized heavy artillery battalion
(The only motorized heavy artillery battalion at the
start of the Winter War was the Rask.Psto 3, armed with 2 batteries
of 152 mm H/17 and one battery of 107 mm K/77, and even that battalion
was only partly motorized as the 107 K/77 battery was still horse drawn.)
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Official strength
|
personnel: |
512 - 521 |
motor vehicles: |
79 |
bicycles: |
17 |
guns: |
12 |
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Finnish artillery shell
situation during the Winter War
Before the Winter War, the GHQ had made calculations of war time shell
supply requirements. At the same time as the basic monthly requirement
figures were calculated, the domestic production capacity was estimated.
The results were alarming, as can be seen from the table below.
Shell type |
C-in-C's reported need |
Domestic production estimate |
75 mm - 76 mm |
466 000 shells/month |
123 000 shells/month |
105 mm howitzer* |
195 000 shells/month |
48 000 shells/month |
105 mm cannon |
23 300 shells/month |
7 800 shells/month |
107 mm cannon |
11 700 shells/month |
3 800 shells/month |
122 mm howitzer |
87 500 shells/month |
18 800 shells/month |
150 mm howitzer |
30 300 shells/month |
6 000 shells/month |
152 mm howitzer |
21 700 shells/month |
4 000 shells/month |
Total |
835 500 shells/month |
211 400 shells/month |
* = as the production of the domestic
105 mm howitzer was delayed, this requirement wasn't to be considered
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(Source: "Suomen kenttätykistön
historia Vol. II", p. 550)
While these figures alone are worrying, in realty, the domestic
production didn't even meet the estimated capacity. The needed machines
for the production of shell cases, ordered before the war from abroad,
didn't arrive in time. Shells were bought from abroad, and arrived
to Finnish ports during the war in a quite sizable amounts.
But the figures don't tell the whole truth, as the sorting of powder,
fuses, shells, casings etc. took time, and before they actually could
be delivered to the troops via arms depots took time.
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Artillery shell
situation of the main calibers at the start of the war
(Source: "Suomen kenttätykistön historia
Vol. II", p. 551)
Gun type |
Shells available |
Shells per gun |
Light cannons (75 mm & 76 mm)
|
205 800 |
720 |
Light howitzer (122 mm) |
43 500 |
640 |
Heavy cannon (107 mm) |
5 100 |
510 |
Heavy howitzer (150 mm & 152
mm) |
16 900 |
528 |
Total |
271 300 |
app. 600 |
To put it short, the shell situation was catastrophic. If the artillery
would've fired the different forms of fire, as required by the artillery
regulations, the Finnish artillery would've expended all it's shells
in 7 - 8 days! This was, by far, the most severe Finnish handicap
in the Winter War.
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The shell expenditure
and domestic production of the most important calibers
(Source: "Suomen kenttätykistön historia
Vol. II", p. 551)
Month |
76 K and 76 LK
|
122 H
|
expenditure
|
production |
expenditure
|
production |
December 1939 |
108 300 shells |
41 000 shells |
11 000 shells |
6 100 shells |
January 1940 |
76 999 shells |
55 124 shells |
8 000 shells |
5 058 shells |
February 1940 |
128 863 shells |
123 774 shells |
21 000 shells |
30 126 shells |
March 1940 |
85 841 shells |
136 287 shells |
21 000 shells |
5 471 shells |
Total |
400 003 shells |
356 185 shells |
61 000 shells |
46 755 shells |
Note: The war ended on March 13th,
but the shell production of March 1940 is for the whole month.
The expenditure figures are a bit different depending on the source,
and the method of calculation, but in general the amounts are
in the same category (compare this table with the following
table). |
The changes
in the quantity of shells available during the war
(Chart courtesy of Col. J.Paulaharju)
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-
Light cannon shell situation is shown with
a blue graph
-
Light howitzer shell situation is shown with
a light purple graph
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Heavy howitzer shell situation is shown with
a red graph
-
Heavy cannon shell situation is shown with
a green graph
|
(As a comparison, the Finnish
artillery had on 1 June 1941, over 2 760 000 shells in stock)
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Back to Top !
Artillery shell
expenditure in the Winter War
(Source: "Suomen kenttätykistön historia
Vol. II", p. 552)
|
Guns with recoil system
|
Light cannons (75 mm - 76 mm) : |
397 462 shells |
Light howitzers (105 mm - 122 mm) : |
62 434 shells |
Heavy cannons (105 mm - 107 mm ) : |
7 058 shells |
Heavy howitzers (150 mm - 152 mm) : |
16 113 shells |
|
Guns without recoil system |
87 K 95 : |
14 187 shells |
90 K 77 : |
5 379 shells |
107 K 77 : |
4 074 shells |
152 K 77 : |
552 shells |
152 K 04 : |
1 707 shells |
|
Expenditure total
|
508 966 shells
|
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(As a comparison, the average daily shell
consumption of the Red Army was around 230 000 shells)
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The armored trains
Picture source: "Talvisodan Historia,
osa 1", p.169
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Characteristics of the 76 VK 04, main guns
Caliber
Barrel length
Shell weight
Muzzle velocity
Max range
Weight in action |
mm
cal
kg
m/s
km
kg |
76,2
13,3
6,5
290
5,5
327 |
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When the Winter War started, Finland had two WW 1 -era armored trains,
that were captured from the Russians during the War of Independence.
Both trains, Ps.Juna 1 and Ps.Juna 2 ("Ps.Juna" is an abbreviation
of "Panssarijuna", which means armored train) had as it's
main armament two 76 mm short barreled guns. The guns were
76 VK 04 -guns, and so the trains had a relatively strong armament
(by Finnish standards) , including also at least 11 machine guns (
I'm not sure of that figure, I got it by counting the mg's visible
in the picture, so if someone has knowledge of this, I'd be happy
to know about it) .
During the mobilization, the trains were both ordered to the Karelian
Isthmus, where they were attached to the II Corps, and the trains
arrived to Säiniö on October 9th, 1939. Before the war started, changes
had been made, and Ps.Juna 1 was on Nov 30th, listed as a part of
the Lake Ladoga coastal artillery. In the first days of the war, Ps.Juna
1 was attached to the JR 36 for support, as the regiment was defending
the Suvilahti - Loimola road in Ladoga Karelia. The train provided
support for the retreating Finns, more often boosting morale than
giving efficient support, but however due to the shortage of artillery
in the area, it was a valuable asset. The Ps.Juna 1 was involved,
almost throughout the war, in assisting the defense of the Kollaa-river.
Later in the war, the Ps.Juna 2, on Jan 23rd 1940, was attached also
to the IV Corps, and it was sent into action immediately. After engaging
the enemy, the train had to sent a part of it's crew to fight as foot
soldiers in the Kollaa-front. On Feb 25th, the Ps.Juna 2 received
an order to move to the Karelian Isthmus, to be attached to the Isthmus
Army, and when the war ended, it was stationed in the sector of the
1.D (1st division) in Kalalampi, near Jääski.
Back to Top !
The
Railway guns
( Although it was considered to
be a part of the coastal artillery, I included it in here, as suggested
by Mr.Paulaharju, as it was used against ground targets)
(Picture:"Itsenäisen Suomen
rannikkotykit 1918-1998", p.184)
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Gun characteristics
|
Caliber. |
152.4 mm |
Barrel length |
45.1 cal |
Total weight w/shield |
17 745 kg |
Elevation |
-2° - 39 ° |
Max range |
20 000 m |
Rate of fire, theoretical |
8 shots/min |
Rate of fire, practical |
6 shots/min |
Shell weight |
41.5 - 51.0 kg |
Source:"Itsenäisen
Suomen rannikkotykit 1918-1998"
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The idea of railway guns was brought
to Finland with two Finnish officers, E.Järvinen and
J.Rikama, who had studied in the Italian Artillery
Institute in Turin. The first test firings were made in March
17th 1924 using the Obuhov manufactured 152/45C (152 mm, C for
"Canet") coastal gun. The idea was, before the war,
to have one 2-gun battery, but when the war started Finland
had only one 1-gun battery of railway guns. The railway
gun battery had as the Finnish designation "1.Rautatiepatteri"
("1st railway gun battery") . The gun was designated
"152/45CRaut".
The battery was mobilized on October
9th, and on Nov 30th, it was ordered to Pitkäranta, on the eastern
coast of Lake Ladoga, the battery was led by Lt. Lauri Paaso.
The battery took part in bombarding the
Soviet ground forces, but as there were orders to save shells,
the times the battery fired (only once or twice from the same
position) , the gun fired only a few shells.
The battery had the code name"Akseli"
(a Finnish first name) , and it operated in Pitkäranta, Impilahti
and Kollaanjoki (River Kollaa) . The battery was unlucky, as
the barrel was damaged on Jan 7th, 1940. The gun was sent to
Helsinki, where a new barrel was installed, and the battery
was back in action on Jan 12th. On March 11th, just two days
before the war ended, the battery received reinforcements as
two new (identical) guns were brought to Impilahti.
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Lessons learned
and things noticed during the war
Fire observation
("FO" in the text)
While the general level of skill was quite high, thanks
to the prewar training, the war still revealed some serious weaknesses
in the artillery FO.
The first problem was the low number of trained FO's,
and few artillery regiments had the full compliment of FO's. This
led to a situation in where there wasn't enough FO's to cover all
needed sectors of the front, and many of the FO-teams had to be constantly
deployed near the front without the chance of proper rest.
The second problem was the lack of combined arms training
before the war. Some of the infantry commanders, who had the luxury
of artillery support, didn't quite understand how to use artillery
efficiently. The bad communications, low number of guns and shortage
of shells all contributed in decreasing the efficiency of the artillery,
thus also lowering the respect for the artillery in the eyes of the
infantry. In course of the war, the cooperation got better, but still
some problems remained especially at the divisional level.
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Transmission
of fire
While the prewar training had it's shortcomings, in
some areas it had been very good. The transmission of fire (i.e. FO
giving a battery/battalion a new target, the calculating of the new
firing data, train the guns into the new target etc.) was very fast
if compared to the Soviet counterpart.
If the connection between the FO and the battery was
in order, the average delay between the FO giving a new target to
the battery/battalion gambit was 5 - 8 minutes.
If the firing unit was already engaging a target, and
was given a new target that was close to the previous one, the average
delay was 2 - 4 minutes. The variation in delay time depended mostly
on two things; 1) the size of the caliber. (the weight of the gun)
and 2) if the gun had to be swung into the new direction (i.e. the
whole gun with it's carriage had to be turned in order to point the
barrel into the right direction) .
As a comparison, the average delay of the Soviet
artillery was 10 - 20 minutes.
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Survey
The prewar plans were, that every Corps would've received
one motorized survey battery (company) . In the summer of 1939, the
plans changed due to shortage of equipment, and the original number
of 6 survey batteries fell down to 4. During mobilization, only 2
survey batteries ("Mittauspatteri" or "Mitt.Ptri"
in Finnish) were actually raised to serve on the front, while 2 batteries
were left to the Home Front to form a replacement battery ("Mittaus-T-Patteri")
. All this because of the shortage of survey equipment. The two survey
batteries, 1.Mitt.Ptri and 2.Mitt.Ptri, were both assigned to the
Karelian Isthmus. The 1.Mitt.Ptri, equipped with the domestic Zerograf-instruments
was deployed to eastern side of the Isthmus, while 2.Mitt.Ptri, equipped
with Siemens-instruments was deployed to the western side of the Isthmus.
After a slow start, the survey batteries started to
show results. Many batteries were located, but the shortage of shells
and heavy (long range) guns restricted the possibilities of counterbattery
fire. It was noticed that it was nearly impossible to pinpoint individual
batteries, if the enemy artillery was firing 'en masse'. But as soon
as the bombardment settled down, leaving only one or two batteries
still keeping up the bombardment, it was possible to measure the direction
and distance to the firing batteries. The survey batteries used both
sonic and flash-ranging as the means of locating the enemy.
In all, the batteries both proved successful in pinpointing
enemy batteries. E.g. the 1.Mitt.Ptri located 301 enemy firing positions
or batteries during the Winter War (some 50% by flash-ranging) , and
after the results were compared to aerial photographs, taken in February,
some 80 % of the coordinates proved to be correct.
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The pre-fire
preparations
The ballistic preparations was mostly performed according
to the regulations, although the lack of and aging instruments created
problems. E.g. many batteries lacked the thermometers needed to measure
the gun powder temperature, which forced the cannoneers to estimate
the temperature, increasing dispersion.
The meteorological preparations wasn't as good as the
ballistic preparations were. Despite the efforts put into this before
the war in terms of equipment, it took a long time before the artillery
weather service got started at all. The situation was worst in northern
Finland, but this wasn't critical as the guns were used often in direct
fire missions. In the Karelian Isthmus, the whole service proved to
be adequate.
The topographical preparations depended on the front.
There were quite good "1:20 000" maps available from the
Isthmus, and from some parts of the Ladoga Karelia, but in the northern
parts of Finland, the only maps were "1:400 000" maps. Still,
the stockpiled storage of maps, proved out to be way to small, thanks
to the shoestring defense budget before the war. There were efforts
to compensate this shortage with different types of maps, like making
maps of aerial photographs taken in the summer of 1939. The resulting
"ik-maps" (the "ik" is an abbreviation of "ilmakuva"
which is "aerial photograph" in Finnish) wasn't liked by
the artillery.
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Communications
While the lack of radios had been noted even before
the war, no funds had been given to remedy this. This proved costly
during the war, as sometimes the call for fire had to be "transmitted"
by a messenger. The Soviet artillery bombardment severed the cables,
which at the early phases weren't dug below the ground. And when some
radios became available during the war, many stupid mistakes were
made, like shipping the radios in a different batch than the batteries,
or giving the troops radios without the valves.
And to make matters worse, the troops in many places
ran out of cables, forcing to use iron wire, which wasn't nearly as
good as cable had been.
In some cases the communication between the fire observer
and the battery/battalion had to be kept up with messengers and blinker
messages. Flares were sometimes used to call in barrages.
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Mobility
The mobility of the horse drawn artillery units proved
to be adequate in short distances, but weak in longer marches. The
Soviet air superiority restricted movement, as the cover of darkness
was the only good protection against strafing fighters. When an artillery
unit was forced to move during daylight (either ordered to, or forced
by the circumstances) , and the weather permitted flying, losses were
almost certainty, especially in the Karelian Isthmus. Some units lacked
skids for the guns and gun sleighs, which made moving in the snow
easier.
Only one artillery battalion had purpose built tractors
(Rask.Psto 3) , others used civilian trucks. Only some 60 % of the
civilian vehicles were suitable for the purpose, as the rest were
too weak or had too small loading capacity. Many artillery tractors
were captured from the enemy, but it took time to repair them and
to get them to the troops. The hard weather conditions, common accidents
and breakdowns etc. reduced on many occasions the already small number
of vehicles, lowering the mobility of the artillery battalions.
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Use of artillery
The low number of artillery pieces and units led to
a point, where the artillery couldn't be used as should have been
used according to the artillery regulations. Only in the Isthmus was
it possible to combine whole artillery battalions to fire concentrated
fire missions. In the Ladoga Karelia, middle- and north Finland, the
few available artillery units were more or less spread around, making
concentrated fire impossible.
Strict orders were given about the shell consumption,
and the priority was given to barrages, or blocking fire, over counterbattery
fire and counter-preparation fire, which had higher priorities in
the 1936 artillery regulations. The appalling shell situation forced
the artillery to conserve, and the shell amounts of different forms
of fire, set by the regulations, remained throughout the war only
a fraction from the "official" demands. E.g. while an artillery
battalion, armed with 76 mm guns, shooting a "barrage fire"was
supposed, according to the regulations, to fire some 120 shells into
a 150 m x 300 m area, in realty the defending infantry was quite lucky
if the battalion fired a few "groups" ("ryhmä"
in Finnish, which in "Finnish artillery language" means
single shots with all guns) to block an enemy attack.
At times, the strictness with the shell expenditure
went to nearly ridiculous proportions, as the permission to fire additional
shells had to be asked for each case separately. E.g. on Dec 16th,
Capt. Sven Gyllenbögel, commander of the 3rd heavy artillery
battalion, wrote in his report to the II Corps artillery commander:
"... at 1100 hrs, I got a report of an active enemy battery...
I asked the permission and fired 4 shells..."
To make the shell situation worse, there were big problems
in the munitions supply. Some batteries received shells of wrong type
or caliber., and bureaucracy in the shell supply was too large and
complex slowing logistics.
The short range of the Finnish artillery pieces made
the counter battery firing very difficult. Whenever possible, this
task was given to the Coastal batteries along the coast of the Gulf
of Finland or the "Kaarnajoki"-coastal fort in the Taipale
sector.
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Comments from
the enemy
In early April, 1940, an analysis was made by the Soviets,
which shows that the Soviet side was familiar with the Finnish artillery
and it's aspects. The analysis gave a good grade to the Finnish artillery
for fire discipline and the economical use of shells. The Finnish
artillery had too few artillery pieces and the bulk of the equipment
was old or obsolete. Shells were used in small numbers and many of
the fired projectiles were duds. The Soviet opinion was that the Finnish
artillery didn't fire enough at targets in front of their (Finnish)
front-line, e.g. at roads leading to concentration areas and mined
& booby-trapped areas. The Finnish skill of improvisation was
praised.
(Source: "Suomen kenttätykistön
historia Vol. II", p. 115)
Go to
The Finnish Army
Part I
Part II
See also:
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